INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,  Plaintiff,  V.  COAST TO COAST GRAND GETAWAYS, LLC,  Defendant.  Defendant.  Defendant.  CLASS ACTION  COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF PURSUANT TO THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. §  227, ET SEQ.  JURY TRIAL DEMANDED	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	CENTRAL DISTR	S DISTRICT COURT
27 /// 28 ///  CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT PAGE 1 OF 12	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27	BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,  Plaintiff,  v.  COAST TO COAST GRAND GETAWAYS, LLC,  Defendant.  ///  ///  ///  ///  ///  ///  ///	COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF PURSUANT TO THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227, ET SEQ.  JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

#### Introduction

- 1. CARRIE COUSER ("Plaintiff") brings this Class Action Complaint for damages, injunctive relief, and any other available legal or equitable remedies, resulting from the illegal actions of COAST TO COAST GRAND GETAWAYS, LLC (hereinafter "CCGG" or "Defendant") in negligently contacting Plaintiff on Plaintiff's cellular telephone, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., ("TCPA"), thereby invading Plaintiff's privacy. Plaintiff alleges as follows upon personal knowledge as to himself and his own acts and experiences, and, as to all other matters, upon information and belief, including investigation conducted by their attorneys.
- 2. The TCPA was designed to prevent calls like the ones described within this complaint, and to protect the privacy of citizens like Plaintiff. "Voluminous consumer complaints about abuses of telephone technology for example, computerized calls dispatched to private homes prompted Congress to pass the TCPA." *Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC*, 132 S. Ct. 740, 744 (2012).
- 3. In enacting the TCPA, Congress intended to give consumers a choice as to how creditors and telemarketers may call them, and made specific findings that "[t]echnologies that might allow consumers to avoid receiving such calls are not universally available, are costly, are unlikely to be enforced, or place an inordinate burden on the consumer. TCPA, Pub.L. No. 102–243, § 11. Toward this end, Congress found that:

[b]anning such automated or prerecorded telephone calls to the home, except when the receiving party consents to receiving the call or when such calls are necessary in an emergency situation affecting the health and safety of the consumer, is the only effective means of protecting telephone consumers from this nuisance and privacy invasion.

Id. at § 12; see also Martin v. Leading Edge Recovery Solutions, LLC, 2012

WL 3292838, at\* 4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2012) (citing Congressional findings on TCPA's purpose).

- 4. Congress also specifically found that "the evidence presented to the Congress indicates that automated or prerecorded calls are a nuisance and an invasion of privacy, regardless of the type of call...." *Id.* at §§ 12-13. *See also, Mims*, 132 S. Ct. at 744.
- 5. As Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit recently explained in a TCPA case regarding calls to a non-debtor similar to this one:

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act ... is well known for its provisions limiting junk-fax transmissions. A less-litigated part of the Act curtails the use of automated dialers and prerecorded messages to cell phones, whose subscribers often are billed by the minute as soon as the call is answered—and routing a call to voicemail counts as answering the call. An automated call to a landline phone can be an annoyance; an automated call to a cell phone adds expense to annoyance.

Soppet v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC, 679 F.3d 637, 638 (7th Cir. 2012).

6. The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed certification of a TCPA class action remarkably similar to this one in *Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Associates*, *LLC*, F.3d , 2012 WL 4840814 (9th Cir. Oct. 12, 2012).

# **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

- 7. This Court has federal question jurisdiction because this case arises out of violation of federal law. 47 U.S.C. §227(b); *Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC*, 132 S. Ct. 740 (2012).
- 8. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Central District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 for the following reasons: (i) Plaintiff resides in the City of Mira Loma, County of Riverside, State of California which is within this judicial district; (ii) the conduct complained

of herein occurred within this judicial district; and, (iii) many of the acts and transactions giving rise to this action occurred in this district because Defendant:

- (a) is authorized to conduct business in this district and has intentionally availed itself of the laws and markets within this district;
- (b) does substantial business within this district;
- (c) is subject to personal jurisdiction in this district because it has availed itself of the laws and markets within this district; and,
- (d) the harm to Plaintiff occurred within this district.

#### **PARTIES**

- 9. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a citizen and resident of the City of Mira Loma, County of Riverside, State of California. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a "person" as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (39).
- 10. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a corporation whose primary corporate address is in the State of Florida, with its principle place of business located at 11219 Marigold Drive, Bradenton, Florida 34202. Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a corporation and is a "person," as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (39). Defendant is a travel service company that sells travel club memberships and travel packages to consumers nationwide. Plaintiff alleges that at all times relevant herein Defendant conducted business in the State of California and in the County of Riverside, and within this judicial district.

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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 1 11.At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California. 2 Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a "person" as defined by 3 47 U.S.C. § 153 (39). 4 12. Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a Florida corporation 5 and a "person," as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (39). 6 13. At all times relevant Defendant conducted business in the State of California 7 and in the County of Riverside, within this judicial district. 8 14. Defendant utilizes bulk SPAM text messaging, or SMS marketing, to send 9 unsolicited text messages, marketing and advertising Defendant's travel 10 package trips. 11 15.On or about February 19, 2014, at approximately 06: 41 a.m. (PST), 12 Defendant sent an unsolicited text message to Plaintiff's cellular telephone 13 ending in "4164." This text message, read: 14 "ND DIGIT[10]@m 15 essaging.sprint.pc 16 s.com>"@mail.tma 17 il.com / / Limited 18 time to get your 19 comp trip for 2: 20 1650"209"4409 21 16.Defendant used SMS<sup>1</sup> "4129" to send this unsolicited text message to 22 Plaintiff's cellular telephone. 23 17. Plaintiff was at no time given an option to "opt-out" of receiving future 24 unsolicited text messages from Defendant. 25 26 The term "Short Message Service" or "SMS" is a messaging system that allows 27 cellular telephone subscribers to use their cellular telephones to send and receive 28 short text messages.

- 18.At no time did Plaintiff provide Plaintiff's cellular phone number to Defendant through any medium, nor did Plaintiff consent to receive such an unsolicited text message.
- 19. Plaintiff has never signed-up for, and has never used, Defendant's services or products, and has never had any form of business relationship with Defendant.
- 20. Through the unsolicited SPAM text message, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff's cellular telephone regarding an unsolicited service via an "automatic telephone dialing system," ("ATDS") as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) and prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A).
- 21. This ATDS has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator.
- 22. The telephone number Defendant called was assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1).
- 23. This text message constituted a call that was not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i).
- 24. Plaintiff did not provide Defendant or its agent prior express consent to receive text messages, including unsolicited text messages, to her cellular telephone, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A).
- 25. The unsolicited text message by Defendant, or its agent, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1).

### **CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS**

- 26.Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all others similarly situated ("the Class").
- 27. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the Class, consisting of:
  - All persons within the United States who were sent a text message substantially similar or identical to the text

message described in Paragraph 15 of the Complaint by Defendant and/or its agent within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint.

- 28.Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the tens of thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter.
- 29. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through its agents, illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones by using an unsolicited SPAM text message/s, thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby.
- 30. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class, and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery.
- 31. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the court. The Class can be identified through Defendant's records or Defendant's agents' records.
- 32. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented. The questions of law

and fact to the Class predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members, including, but not limited to, the following:

- a) Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, Defendant or its agents sent any unsolicited text message/s (other than a message made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) to a Class member using any automatic dialing and/or SMS texting system to any telephone number assigned to a cellular phone service;
- b) Whether Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby, and the extent of damages for such violation; and
- c) Whether Defendant and its agents should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future.
- d) Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to any other relief.
- 33.As a person who received at least one unsolicited SPAM text message without Plaintiff's prior express consent, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to any member of the Class.
- 34. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the Defendant's unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendant will likely continue such illegal conduct. Because of the size of the individual Class member's claims, few, if any, Class members could afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein.
- 35. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

- 36.A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendant to comply with federal and California law. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because the maximum statutory damages in an individual action for violation of privacy are minimal. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those presented in many class claims.
- 37. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole.

## FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

# NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

- 38.Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein.
- 39. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.
- 40.As a result of Defendant's negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to an award of \$500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).
- 41.Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future.

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**SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION** 1 KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE 2 **TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT** 3 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. 4 42. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this 5 Complaint as though fully stated herein. 6 43. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and 7 multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not 8 limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 9 227 et seq. 10 44. As a result of Defendant's knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 11 227 et seq., Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to an award of \$1,500.00 in 12 statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 13 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 14 45. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief 15 prohibiting such conduct in the future. 16 PRAYER FOR RELIEF 17 Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court grant Plaintiff and the Class 18 members the following relief against Defendant: 19 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT VIOLATION OF 20 THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. 21 As a result of Defendant's negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), 22 Plaintiff seeks for herself and each Class member \$500.00 in statutory 23 damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 24 227(b)(3)(B). 25 Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such 26 conduct in the future. 27 Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. 28

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF 1 THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. 2 As a result of Defendant's knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. 3 § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for herself and each Class member \$1,500.00 4 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 5 § 227(b)(3)(B). 6 Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such 7 conduct in the future. 8 Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. 9 TRIAL BY JURY 10 46. Pursuant to the seventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States 11 of America, Plaintiff is entitled to, and demands, a trial by jury. 12 13 Dated: April 14, 2014 Respectfully submitted, 14 KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC 15 16 17 By: /s/Gouya Ranekouhi ABBAS KAZEROUNIAN 18 GOUYA RANEKOUHI 19 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PAGE 11 OF 12 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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